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Abstract
The rise of Major League Soccer in the United States has taken place during an
influential spread of social media. This paper conducts an empirical analysis of
the effects of several variables on the Facebook “likes” of individual Major
League Soccer Facebook homepages. Variables from previous sport demand
studies are re-analyzed and applied in this study to determine similarities and
differences to Facebook “likes”. Results from the analysis indicate social media is
affected differently than attendance rates. Facebook “likes” are most affected by
population size, unemployment and Hispanic composition as well as player salary
rather than wins or attendance.
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I.

Introduction

Commonly referred to as the world’s favorite sport, soccer dominates the
international sports arena and is passionately followed by avid fans. The beloved sport
dates back to the mid-1800s and is so deeply engrained in some societies that even
governments invest heavily in their local soccer clubs1. Yet, amidst the fervor, soccer has
struggled to make its way to American soil. That is, until now: Major League Soccer
(MLS) is America’s longest lasting and most successful professional soccer league.
From its first season in 1996, MLS has nearly doubled in size and remains financially
stable: a feat its predecessor, the National American Soccer League (NASL) failed to
accomplish. As an infant industry, MLS was forced to adapt to a highly competitive and
hostile environment. Soccer had crumbled in the U.S. professional sport arena and was
largely ignored at the international level. NASL was notorious for lacking media
attention, diminishing fan support over time, and facing constant financial difficulties that
would inevitably lead to the folding of the league. MLS had the advantage of learning
from the mistakes NASL had made, but they would have to find success on their own.
Against these odds, MLS founders believed it could make American sports fans see the
light.
MLS had to be perfect or it would undoubtedly simmer out as NASL had. Therefore,
decisions were carefully thought out before the league was launched. First, MLS chose to
organize itself as a single-entity. This means teams are centrally owned by MLS and

1

Stefan Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist, National Pastime: How Americans Play Baseball and the Rest of the World
Plays Soccer. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2005)
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player contracts are negotiated by the league rather than by individual teams. As a result,
MLS players are paid under 30% of league revenues compared to over 40% in the
England Premier League, over 50% in the NBA, and around 60% in the NHL, MLB, and
NFL2.
The cost savings in the single-entity approach comes with setbacks. Cost reduction in
human capital limits the leagues development; the best players will opt for higher pay in
international leagues. Without these players, the league is at risk of losing fan support as
quality of play is diminished. Foreseeing these future implications, MLS introduced the
Designated Player Rule which removes the salary cap for up to three players per team.
Shortly after the rule was established, soccer sensation David Beckham was acquired by
the Los Angeles Galaxy. His presence immediately grabbed the attention of Americans
and fan support increased significantly3.
The next major decision MLS would consider was whether to invest in soccer
specific stadiums. NASL had chosen to cut costs by playing in NFL stadiums. However,
football stadiums are larger than soccer stadiums and do not have the correct field lines.
NASL games ended up looking unprofessional in these conditions. Understanding the
importance of legitimacy, MLS decided to invest in soccer specific stadiums. The
investment would give MLS an identity as well as provide teams their own resources4.
Finally, MLS had to make strategic marketing decisions in order to gain fan support.
To survive as a sports league, media attention is essential but MLS knew the majority of
Americans would be disinterested in the league at first. As a result, MLS began
2

Beau Dure, Long Range Goals: The Success Story of Major League Soccer (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.,
2010), 100
3
Robert A. Lawson et al.,“Vend it Like Beckham: David Beckham’s Effect on MLS Ticket Sales,” International
Journal of Sports Science 3, no. 4 (2008)
4
Dure 2010, 60
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marketing toward the Hispanic community where soccer was already an established
pastime. The decision was made with the idea the league would easily find initial support
from this audience, gain strength, and be able to spread influence elsewhere5.
As a new phenomenon in America, relatively few studies have been done on MLS.
As the league is likely to continue its rise, several variables can be examined to measure
the leagues popularity. Past sports demand studies have focused on ticket sales as a
measurement of demand; however, as the world is changing into one of media
dominance, this may not be an accurate measure of demand as fans are now able to watch
matches on TV and receive information on the internet. Given these changing times, a
better dependent variable should be one that incorporates more than just game
attendance. I attempt to capture this movement by observing the number of Facebook
“likes” for a given team.
Comparing attendance rates and Facebook “likes”, I find both are affected by similar
variables. However, highly correlated variables regularly found in sports demand studies,
such as wins and attendance, are not found. These differences suggest social media is
explained by other variables.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II is a literature review of sports
demand studies. I focus on attendance variables to better understand what has previously
determined demand for soccer. Section III is an analysis of the data chosen for this study.
I provide hypotheses for each variable effect on Facebook “likes” in Section IV. Results
are presented in Section V and variables are re-analyzed. Summarizing and concluding
the study, Section VI addresses the findings that have future implications.

5

Dure 2010, 11
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II.

Literature Review

Sports market research has focused on attendance as a measurement of success.
Attendance is high when a team performs well and low when they perform poorly.
Clearly, attendance rates say a lot about a team. Previous research has tried to explain
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attendance by looking at explanatory variables such as ticket prices6, travel costs,
population7, income, team quality, player quality, game conditions, and competition with
other professional sports. Studies within the U.S. have begun to focus on racial
composition as another relevant factor affecting game attendance. Research has covered
the effects of Hispanic composition within a team’s city8, superstar effects9, and the
single-entity league organizational approach10. Because MLS is a young league in the
U.S., it is still developing and changing regularly. This makes analyzing the sport
difficult as its youth and unique organization are new to researchers. Furthermore, not
enough time has passed for outcomes to be realized or clearly observed.
A. Creating a Fan Base
Before accomplishing a strong hold in America, soccer would have to overcome a stigma
of immigrant association and the humiliation of past failures. As with any professional
sport, broadcasting is essential. As for the MLS, broadcasting to the right audience was
and remains an important essential. MLS learned from its predecessor’s mistakes by
recognizing that in the past, NASL had weak coverage within English speaking channels
and were unable to gain support11. In order to get a foot in the door, a fan base was a first
priority. MLS decided that marketing to an audience where soccer was an established
pastime would be the best starting point.

6

Richard C. K. Burdekin, “Demand for Attendance: Price Measurement,” Oxford Handbook on Sports Economics
Bruce Walker, “The Demand for Professional League Football and the Success of Football League Teams: Some City
Size Effects,” Urban Studies 23 (1986)
8
Todd R. Jewell et al., “An Evaluation of the Relationship Between Hispanics and Major League Soccer,” Journal of
Sports Economics 6, no. 2 (2005)
9
Robert A. Lawson et al., “Vend it Like Beckham: David Beckham’s Effect on MLS Ticket Sales,” International
Journal of Sports Finance 3, no. 4 (2008)
10
John Twomey et al., “Monopsony and Salary Suppression: The Case of Major League Soccer in the United States,”
American Economist 56, no. 1 (2011)
11
Fernando Delgado, “Major League Soccer: The Return of the Foreign Sport,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 21,
no. 3 (1997)
7
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Latin America has a long history of strong soccer leagues and dedicated fans.
Coincidentally, Hispanics are the largest and fastest growing minority group in America.
Thus, the Hispanic population seemed to be the perfect audience to market. This strategy
in practice would reveal a complicated outcome as a surprising relationship would
unravel between a city’s Hispanic composition and MLS game attendance.
An early study by Jewell & Molina (2005) on game attendance during the first five
years of the MLS league suggests the MLS was unsuccessful and/or wrong in its
marketing decisions. Yearly attendance data is used as the dependent variable and
performance factors, as well as team specific city factors, are used as independent
variables. The authors regress yearly regular season attendance on several variables,
including racial composition, and find the Hispanic coefficient to be negative. This
suggests larger Hispanic populations have a negative impact on attendance, which is
ironic given the MLS’s obvious attempts to market toward this group.
Without available data on Hispanic preferences, the authors make a few suggestions
for this unexpected outcome: (1) Mexican-Americans are dedicated to their home teams
and leagues and prefer them over the American league; (2) Cuban and Puerto Rican
Americans prefer baseball to soccer; and (3) MLS may have done a poor job marketing
itself.
A later study by Lawson, Sheehan & Stephenson (2007) find contrasting results on
Hispanic composition. They run a multivariate regression with attendance as a percentage
of stadium capacity as the dependent variable. The authors use two different approaches
to control for city specific factors. The first, also used by Jewell & Molina (2005),
focuses on specific market factors within the home team’s city. The second approach
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focuses on team specific factors. The authors chose to omit ticket prices as Jewell and
Molina had for similar reasons: inconsistent pricing data across teams. The regression is
run using Tobit and results for both approaches show a positive relationship between
Hispanic composition and game attendance. The authors do not provide any suggestions
for the contradicting results.
B. The Effects of City size
Results in a study by Walker (1986) show a positive relationship between successful
teams, city population, and game attendance. Walker argues teams located in more
populous areas tend to have higher attendance rates as well as more successful seasons.
The data for the study is taken from league standings of English professional football
teams. Walker uses correlations between data on league standings, urban area rankings
(taken from rankings of Standard Metropolitan Labour Areas in 1971), and estimates of
population share for each team. The positive relationship between city size and
attendance is explained by larger cities being better able to attract more spectators and
thus generate larger gate revenues. These revenues in turn provide resources for team
development and ultimately better team standing within the league.
Later research by Jewell & Molina (2005) on MLS and city size support the findings
by Walker. The study uses yearly attendance as the dependent variable and demographic
information as the independent variable to determine the effects of city size.

The

coefficient for population is positive; further evidence that city size plays a part in
attendance and success rates
C. Superstar Effects in the Single-Entity System

13

In an attempt to increase ticket sales, a large and controversial decision was made to
sign David Beckham with the Los Angeles Galaxy. He was the first player to be signed
outside the salary cap under the single-entity league structure. The greater salary
allotment given to Beckham would be the first under the Designated Player Rule
(beginning in 2007), which allows one player per team to be signed outside the salary
cap. Lawson, Sheehan, & Stephenson (2007) worked to determine Beckham’s effect on
ticket sales during his first season with the Galaxy. The 2007 MLS season average ticket
sales were 16,758 for all games played. The average ticket sales for games with Beckham
on the roster were 29,697 and when he saw game time were 37,659. These numbers were
found by taking an informal look at the ticket sales for the 2007 season, knowing which
games Beckham appeared on the roster and didn’t play, and which games Beckham
appeared on the roster and did play. To isolate the effects of Beckham exclusively, the
authors use a multivariate regression analysis of the 2007 season data along with
explanatory variables.
To account for differences in stadium size, the authors observe attendance as a
percentage of stadium capacity as the dependent variable. The variables of interest are
games with Beckham on the roster and games Beckham played. To control for variations
across cities, the authors account for city specific factors: population, income per capita,
Hispanic and black compositions, team quality measured by home team points during
previous season, and competition from other major league teams. They also include a
dummy variable for players who were on the U.S. World Cup team as a measurement of
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recognizable star players. Game specific variables include the amount of precipitation12
and scheduling (i.e games played during the middle of the week or on holidays). Price
variables are not included because of inconsistency across teams.
The results of the Tobit test show significant marginal effects for both Beckham on
the roster (32.7% ticket sale increase) and Beckham game time (additional 24.3%
increase).
The effects on actual wins are much less according to Twomey & Monks (2011).
Data for the 2007 season revealed team salaries failed to translate to success rates on the
field. For example, the LA Galaxy paid more than double for its roster than any other
team in the league, yet they finished third to last. The New England Revolution finished
five points below the top team and had the lowest league payroll. Yet, the LA Galaxy’s
$36 million revenue for the 2007 season more than doubled any other team in the league
(the closest being Toronto FC at $17 million).
The findings from the Twomey & Monks (2011) study on team salaries and league
success rates suggest that investors are profit-maximizers rather than win-maximizers.
Keuthe & Motamed (2009) confirm this with their finding of a convex relationship
between age and salary. Two probable explanations are given. First, the incentive to
increase attendance creates a market for recognizable players who are at the end of their
careers. If MLS was win-maximizing, Beckham’s salary would be greatly reduced or
even cut. Second, MLS provides young players access to a professional league where
they can develop their skills but, as these players mature, they convert to better

12

Andrew Chupp et al., “Stadium Alcohol Availability and Baseball Attendance: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment,” International Journal of Sports Finance 2, no. 1 (2007)
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international leagues. The result is a league where old and famous players are paid
enormous amounts and young underdeveloped players receive the bare minimum.
The single-entity structure was successful in containing player salary and allowing
the league to develop as a profit maximizing entity. However, set-backs to this approach
should not be ignored by MLS management. As discussed by Tavis & Udayan (2008)
and Twomey & Monks (2011), the outcomes of wage suppression will result in low
growth rates. The fact high salary players are expected to fill seats result in salaries
failing to correspond to team success. Player quality and development are missing in this
unsustainable model and will be detrimental to the future of the league.
D. Other Professional Major Leagues
Cities where professional teams have already been established pose a threat to MLS.
The sport markets in these cities are at risk of becoming saturated and are likely to be
hostile toward new and different sports. Evidence from the Jewell & Molina study (2005)
shows lower MLS attendance rates in cities where an MLS team and National Football
League (NFL) team are both located. This suggests soccer and football are substitutes for
sports entertainment. Comparing cities with and without a National Basketball
Association (NBA) team have an opposite effect; those with NBA teams have greater
MLS attendance than those without. This finding suggests soccer and basketball are
complimentary goods. Another explanation is these two sports are played at different
times of the year and thus avoid game time overlap (MLS during the summer and NBA
during the winter).
In the same study, the National Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Baseball
(MLB) show no significant effect on MLS attendance. However, when all four major
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leagues are in the same city, there is a negative effect on MLS game attendance, possibly
due to sport market saturation.
Once again, in contrast to the Jewell & Molina (2005) findings are those found in the
Lawson, Sheehan, & Stephenson study (2007). Results from the Tobit test show a
significant 16% drop in MLS game attendance when an MLB franchise is within the
same city. Furthermore, NFL, NBA, or NHL teams have a positive effect on ticket sales.
But again, the opposing results are not discussed within the literature review.

I.

Data Collection and Analysis

The dependent variable consists of one time observations of Facebook “likes” taken
for each MLS team on February 26th 2012. The independent variables consist of team
specific information and information specific to the city in which the team is located. The
number of observations is equal to the number of games each team played in the 2010
and 2011 season independently (16 observations in 2010 and 18 observations in 2011).
Data

for

team

standings

was

taken

from

the

MLS

website

(http://www.mlssoccer.com/schedule). During the 2010 season, there were 16 teams in
the league and a total of 30 games played. Each team played two games against the other
in a home game and an away game. The Portland Timbers and Vancouver Whitecaps
joined the league in 2011, increasing the number of teams to 18 and total games played to
34. The MLS uses a point system to determine league standings; three points are awarded
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for a win, one point for a tie, and zero for a loss. MLS also records goals scored and
number of wins within a season. While points acquired during the season determine
league standing, there are instances where teams with the same record have different
points (Kansas City and Columbus tied for 13 wins during the 2011 season but Kansas
City had more points), and where teams with less wins have more points (Seattle won
two more games than FC Dallas but scored two fewer points). For this study, season wins
are used as they closely reflect goals and points. w2010 and w2011 measures total 2010
season wins and total season 2011 for each team. The 2012 season was excluded from the
data set because the MLS was midseason. Because of this, likes represents Facebook
“likes” recorded February 26th, 2012, prior to any games played in the 2012 season to
avoid changes resulting from games played.
The MLS Players Union, established in 2003 as a collective bargaining
representative, publishes annual reports on every contracted player’s salary. This data,
found on the Major League Soccer Players Union website (mlsplayers.org), includes a
base salary and an annual average guaranteed compensation. Top3 measures the top three
highest paid players on a team’s roster using the annual average guaranteed compensation
numbers. These salaries are then combined and used as a total to be compared among
other teams. I have chosen to calculate star player quality this way for two reasons: first,
the Designated Player Rule allows up to three players per roster to be paid above the
salary cap. Identifying the top three salaries essentially distinguishes these designated
players. Second, while star players have previously been determined as those who have
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participated on World Cup teams13 or MLS All Star Games14 , the MLS profitmaximizing strategy demands recognizable rather than the best performing players.
These characteristics are not always analogous; famous players tend to be at the end of
their careers but can still attract crowds.
Attendance data for the 2011 season is available on the MLS website. Attend2011 is
the average game attendance for each team measured by taking total season attendance
and dividing by total number of games played (17 games played for each team). The
average is used because likes is a snapshot measure taken after the 2011 season.
Therefore, the effects of attendance from game to game cannot be observed on likes.
The most recent data available for city specific factors is taken from the 2010 United
States Census Bureau. Pop2010 is the total population, hisplatino measures the
Hispanic/Latino composition, unemploy is the unemployment rate, and percapita is per
capita income. Data is taken from the MLS team’s hometown or from the larger
metropolitan area (Colorado Rapids are based in Commerce City, a suburb of Denver.)
Hisplatino is recorded as a percentage of total population and includes Mexican,
Salvadorian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Puerto Rican, Peruvian, Cuban,
Columbian, Argentinean, and Ecuadorian. As discussed by Jewell & Molina (2005), the
large variety of races defined as Hispanic or Latino may distort the data. Including the
entire composition will have a downward bias on the results as mainly MexicanAmericans, only a fraction of Hispanics, have an established history of soccer. Unemploy

13

Todd R. Jewell et al., “An Evaluation of the Relationship Between Hispanics and Major League Soccer,” Journal of
Sports Economics 6, no. 2 (2005)
14
Todd E.Keuthe et al.,“Returns to Stardom: Evidence From U.S. Major League Soccer,” Journal of Sports Economics
11, no. 5 (2009)
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and percapita are included to determine whether MLS is an inferior good; demand
increases as income decreases.
Dummy variables for individual major leagues were included to account for sport
preferences within cities. nfl, mlb, nba, and nhl represent National Football League,
Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, and National Hockey League,
respectively. These leagues were chosen because they are the most popular among U.S
sports fans. Each major league is assigned a “1” if located in the same city as an MLS
team. Majorleague is the total number of major leagues located in the same city and is
included to account for sport market saturation. Additionally, notsoccerspecific is a
dummy variable indicating whether an MLS team has its own soccer stadium. An MLS
team is assigned a “1” if they do not have their own stadium and play in a stadium shared
by other sports leagues.
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I.

Hypotheses

The uniqueness of this study must be recognized before hypotheses can be made
about variable relationships. Firstly, MLS is relatively new compared to major leagues
within the U.S. and soccer leagues abroad. This makes it difficult to compare the league
to more established sports. Secondly, the current growth of MLS is occurring during an
important societal shift towards social media. Social media has arguably become one of
the most important marketing strategies for companies. Because of the changing times,
new variables are being introduced and old variables must be re-analyzed. Thirdly, the
dependent variable used in this study is unlike any other study. Sports studies have
typically used attendance as the dependent variable because it is useful in understanding
team popularity, revenues, and failures. In this study, Facebook “likes” are used in an
attempt to capture the increasing importance of social media.
Several difficulties have arisen during this study in measuring likes for MLS teams.
First, unlike attendance, likes are continuously updated; the current number reflects total
number of people who have “liked” the page. There is no historical database for likes
which makes observing changes in the past challenging. While I have one “snapshot” of
likes (taken February 26th), the numbers are constantly increasing. Furthermore, because
it is a combined total, net change cannot be observed. To account for this, total season
wins and average game attendance were used rather than individual wins and game
attendance. The remaining independent variables have been widely used among sports
demand studies; unemployment, Hispanic composition, city population, major leagues,
stadium capacity, star players, income and poverty rates.
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With the observations mentioned above in mind, the following provides predictions
on variable relationships. It is reasonable to assume a team with more wins will have
more likes; winning teams draw media attention. Thus, I predict a positive relationship
between likes and season wins for both 2010 and 2011. Similarly, attendance and likes
should have a positive relationship as more people who attend games will also “like”
their team’s homepage.
Star players, measured as the highest paid on their team’s roster, are more likely to
increase gate revenues than produce wins15. Because MLS is argued to be profitmaximizing, rather than win-maximizing16, it is no surprise that players drawing the most
fans will be the most sought after and paid the highest amounts. Whether these highly
paid players effect likes is an important question for social media. I predict these famous
players will attract media attention and positively affect likes for their team.
Hispanic and Latino compositions have shown mixed results as to whether they help
or hurt MLS attendance. For this study, I predict they will have a positive relationship
with likes because MLS has made Spanish easily accessible on their website (mls.net).
Spanish speakers who have navigated the MLS website without difficulty are likely to
search their favorite teams on Facebook as well. Furthermore, soccer is more widely
accepted in this community and I predict this will have a positive impact on likes.
MLS teams located in larger cities may have an advantage over smaller cities with
regard to attendance rates17, but I predict a smaller effect on likes. Attending a game

15

Robert A. Lawson et al., “Vend it Like Beckham: David Beckham’s Effect on MLS Ticket Sales,” International
Journal of Sports Finance 3, no. 4 (2008)
16
John Monks et al., “Monopsony and Salary Suppression: The Case of Major League Soccer in the United States,”
American Economist 56, no. 1 (2011)
17
Bruce Walker, “The Demand for Professional League Football and the Success of Football League Teams: Some
City Size Effects,” Urban Studies 23 (1986)
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requires time and money. “Liking” a Facebook page is costless and practically effortless.
Additionally, “liking” a page can be done from around the world. Facebook is neither
restricted by geographic obstacles nor is it limited due to population rates. Therefore,
likes should not be greatly hindered by population as attendance has been.
Unemployment rates and per capita income should not affect like. As mentioned
previously, the act of “liking” a Facebook page is costless and requires little time (not
accounting for costs associated with purchasing a computer or internet access), thus
economic variables should not matter.
While competition among sports leagues should also be mitigated by the accessibility
of Facebook, preferences are not changed. I predict major leagues located within the
same city as an MLS team will have a negative effect on likes. Competition among
leagues may still remain an issue for MLS because of the American disinterest in soccer.
There are few obstacles preventing a football fan from “liking” an MLS page. Yet, the
established football culture may override any desire to visit an MLS Facebook page.
Other considerations, discussed in the Jewell & Molina study (2005), are differences in
the timing of game season and differences in styles of play. While I still expect
preferences to play a role, these considerations may lessen their effect on likes. For
example, the MLS spring season will not coincide with the NFL or NBA seasons,
allowing it to be less dominated by these popular sports. Also, differences in style of play
may attract or repel fans -- games with a lot of stoppages (NFL) vs. few stoppages (NBA
and MLS). If my prediction is wrong and the results show either no relationship or a
positive relationship, it may be attributed to an increased demand in sports or an absence
of American sport preference.
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II.

Results

The number of observations in this study limits the results of the regression analysis.
With only 16 observations (teams in the league) for the 2010 data and 18 observations
(addition of Portland Timbers and Vancouver Whitecaps) for the 2011 data,
multicollinearity becomes an issue. To deal with this, I have regressed independent
variables both separately and in combinations to determine differences in explanatory
power. Another difficulty arising from limited observations is finding significant values
using basic regressions. The natural logarithm is calculated and used in the regression
analysis for this reason. Finally, due to these limits, I have considered p-values up to 20%
to be significant.
A. Team specific factors
To determine the effects of team specific factors, I regress likes on factors pertaining
to individual teams.18

lnlikesi = α0+ α1lnwins2010 + α2lnwins211 + α3lnattend2010 + α4lnattend2011 + α5lntop3
+ α6lnnotsoccerspec + ε

Results from the regression are given in the table below. As the p-values indicate, no
significant results are found from the regression. Including all team specific varaibles
could create noise in the data due to inter-variable effects. For example, wins during 2010
may effect 2011 wins and 2011 attendance. To avoid this and to determine isolated

18

Data for team specific variables found in Appendix, Table 1
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effects, I have regressed lnlikes against team specific variables independantly in the
sections below.

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

lnwins2010

0.6450012

1.549662

0.686

lnwins2011

-0.4300426

1.296797

0.747

lnattend2011

0.8036167

2.526526

0.757

lnattend2010

0.6968426

2.129387

0.750

lntop3

0.2675015

0.4711525

0.583

_cons

-7.731335

11.66702

0.523

Note: number of obs = 16, R-squared = 0.2552

A surprising relationship was found between MLS 2011 season wins, 2011 average
game attendance and Facebook “likes”. Based on previous win and attendance results in
the Walker study (1986), I predicted wins and attendance for each season to have a
positive relation with likes. Again, my research on relevant literature would lead me to
believe season wins and attendance would indirectly increase likes due to increased fan
support. However, neither wins2010 nor wins2011 had any effect on likes.
Season 2010 & 2011 Wins
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err

P>t

lnwins2010

0.9538874

1.070658

0.388

_cons

8.886491

2.578468

0.004

Notes: number of obs = 16, R-squared = 0.0537

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

lnwins2011

0.593053

0.7672264

0.451

_cons

9.724481

1.820222

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.036

In an attempt to explain the insignificant and unexpected relation between likes and
wins2010, wins2011, I run a regression on wins and attendance to verify the results from
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previous studies. Using the same data set but changing the dependent variable from likes
to attend2011, I find a positive relationship between attendance and wins for the 2011
season. While this verifies previous research, it does not help explain the insignificant
effect of wins on Facebook “likes”.
2011 Season Attendance and Wins
lnattend2011

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

lnwins2011

0.2641286

0.1743587

0.149

_cons

9.13014

0.4136608

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.1254

The positive and significant coefficients on attend2010 and attend2011 would not
have been surprising had wins2010 and wins2011 also been positive and significant. It is
rational to assume the more wins an MLS team has, the more fans they will gain, and the
more likes they will acquire. However, the results cast a confusing picture; teams with
higher average attendance rates have higher likes relative to other MLS teams, yet teams
averaging more wins do not enjoy the same effect on likes.
2010 Season Attendance and Likes
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

lnattend2010

1.589542

0.9209215

0.106

_cons

-4.208023

8.912519

0.644

Notes: number of obs = 16, R-squared = 0.1755

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

lnattend2011

1.578307

0.9706645

0.123

_cons

-4.272691

9.466997

0.658

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.1418

As predicted, top3 has a positive relationship with likes. The result suggests star
players successfully attract social media attention. It is important to remember top3 is

26

determined by player salary and not by player quality. Player quality would be measured
by World Cup participation, number of total goals scored, or number of assists. These
variables measure player contributions to the outcome of the game. Player salaries are
determined by MLS team managers who value players based on ability to fill seats, not
necessarily win games19. Therefore, the results indicate likes are not necessarily increased
due to better player quality, but by player recognition.
Star players
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

lntop3

0.5173092

0.3220712

0.128

_cons

3.754003

4.590343

0.425

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.1389

The incentive behind the investment in soccer specific stadiums was to promote
legitimacy and create space for teams to practice. The results indicate the investments
were worth while; teams without soccer stadiums have 8% less likes than teams with
soccer stadiums.
Soccer Specific Stadiums
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

notsoccers

-0.8120184

0.6040543

0.198

_cons

11.34027

0.3183646

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.1015

B. City specific factors

19

Robert A. Lawson et al., “Vend it Like Beckham: David Beckham’s Effect on MLS Ticket Sales,” International
Journal of Sports Finance 3, no. 4 (2008)
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I find calculating the natural log for city specific variables does not produce better
results as it had for team specific variables. Therefore, I do not calculate natural log for
the independent variables. To determine city specific factors I regress combinations of
variables as well as individual variables against the natural log of likes.

lnlikesi = α0+ α1lnhisplatino2010 + α2lnpop2010 + α3lnpercapita + α4lnunemploy2010 +
α5lnmajorleagues + ε

The combined regression using city specific factors showed no significant results,
again possibly due to inter-variable relations creating noise in the data.

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

hisplatino2010

-1.102115

2.424493

0.659

pop2010

7.59E-07

3.64E-07

0.064

percapita

0.0000216

0.0000491

0.669

unemploy2010

15.62379

16.90093

0.377

majorleagues

-0.1400404

0.1625549

0.409

_cons

9.063705

2.010933

0.001

Notes: number of obs = 16, R-squared = 0.5171

The Hispanic composition within a city has a significant and positive relationship
with likes. This relationship is consistent with the Lawson, Sheehan, and Stephenson
(2007) results. While the dependent variable for this study is different, is it not surprising
that Hispanic composition would have a similar positive impact on likes due to the
history of soccer among this culture.
2010 Hispanic and Latino Composition
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lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

hisplatino2010

2.280865

1.59008

0.171

_cons

10.57921

0.4599461

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.1139

The coefficient for pop2010 is significant and largely positive in relation to the other
variable results. In contrast to my prediction, the size of the population does affect likes.
MLS teams in less populous cities have less likes, indicating population is still an
obstacle for social media as it has been for attendance. Where larger populations are
better able to fill stadiums, it seems they are also better able to increase likes.

2010 Population
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

pop2010

6.46E-07

1.97E-07

0.005

_cons

10.2164

0.352464

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.4008

Not surprisingly, percapita does not affect likes. Given ticket pricing is not relevant
for actions that are free, the per capita income of a city should not effect likes. As I argue,
Facebook is free and “liking” a page is effortless. Therefore, a persons income does not
constrain their ability to “like” an MLS teams homepage.

Per Capita Income
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

percapita

-0.0000163

0.0000458

0.727

_cons

11.65232

1.341518

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 16, R-squared = 0.009
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That income variables should not affect likes was true for perpita. However, results
for unemploy show income variables do effect likes. The unemployment rate within a city
increases number of likes but per capita income fails to show the same effect. This
suggests income and unemployment are not related. Walker (1986) attributed the positive
unemployment and attendance relationship to soccer being an inferior good. The result in
this study cannot be directly due to soccer being an inferior good because likes do not
cost anything. A potential explanation for the result may the unemployed have more free
time to surf the web.

2010 Unemployment
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

unemploy2010

28.5472

10.47504

0.015

_cons

8.439199

1.009684

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.317

A regression including all four major leagues do not produce significant results.
Separately, coefficients for nfl and nba are significant and coefficients for mlb and nhl are
insignificant. NFL and NBA teams located in the same city as MLS teams decrease and
increase likes, respectively. MLB and NHL show no effect on likes. These results do not
say whether likes are affected by sports market saturation, or whether preferences for
football and basketball are greater than demand for soccer.
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Major League Teams
lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

nfl

-1.138884

0.4232038

0.019

mlb

0.9543824

0.5019125

0.080

nba

0.4132985

0.4169461

0.340

nhl

-0.1388736

0.3606003

0.706

_cons

10.66565

0.4805295

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.5026

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

nfl

-0.5838247

0.3736952

0.138

_cons

11.56879

0.3939093

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.1324

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

mlb

0.4040897

0.3738607

0.296

_cons

10.66572

0.4984809

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.068

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

nba

0.8036937

0.378068

0.049

_cons

10.31101

0.4543812

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.2202

lnlikes

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>t

nhl

0.4156183

0.3337778

0.231

_cons

10.69909

0.4309052

0.000

Notes: number of obs = 18, R-squared = 0.0883
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I.

Conclusion

Social media has become an essential part of any business model. Sports franchises
are no exception. Introduced in the midst of Facebook and other online media sources,
MLS has had to embrace this model. To capture the shift in demand measurements from
attendance data, this study uses Facebook likes as an alternative measure of team
popularity. The greatest implication found in this study is the insignificant relationship
between number of team wins during the 2010 and 2011 seasons and Facebook “likes”.
Previous research has repeatedly shown wins increase attendance rates. Yet, this study
concludes social media may be unaffected by the success rates of MLS teams. While
attendance increases likes, the indirect relationship expected to persist between wins and
likes was not found.
Perhaps the findings on star players can shed light on the curious relationship
between wins and likes. Star players, or those with the highest salaries, attract fans but do
not necessarily produce wins for their team. This could be why teams with the highest
paid players have greater likes but not wins. The Los Angeles Galaxy’s David Beckham
is the perfect example. He is one of the highest paid MLS players and has increased
Galaxy gate revenues yet, he has been injured for the majority of his MLS career.
Beckham’s salary is driven by the incentives found in the single-entity approach. The
incentives in this organization are revenue based; player salary is lost to the leagues
financial gain. Therefore, it can be argued that teams demand players who increase
revenues, which, as we have seen, are not necessarily players producing wins.
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At first glance, it seems MLS has a strong and advantageous business strategy. They
are producing high revenues and seeing fan support increase. In the beginning, the singleentity approach was essential for financial survival. As an infant industry, containing
player salary is vital with tight budgets. Now, it’s a detriment to its future. As the league
continues to develop, low wages will negatively affecting player quality; better players
are leaving for higher wages abroad. Even with the implementation of the Designated
Player rule, low salaries continue to be an issue among the majority of athletes not
included.
This study has begun to uncover the impact of social media and the driving forces
behind it. Further research in this area should be done to better understand the effects of
social media. Twitter accounts among players are widely used and followed by fans. Data
from Twitter could reveal useful information on social media and efficient use of these
resources.

